


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OCTOBER 1943

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

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Washington, D. C.

October 1943

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Section I. NEW SELF-PROPELLED GUN

In Russia the Germans are using a new armored self-propelled gun, which bears at least an outward resemblance to the Pz. Kw. 6, the German tank often referred to as the "Tiger."² The new self-propelled gun (see fig. 3) mounts an 88-mm cannon in a fixed turret, and has an over-all weight of 70 tons. Its maximum speed is reported to be not more than 12 miles per hour.

Although the armor of the new weapon, especially the front armor, is said to be harder to pierce than that of the Pz. Kw. 6, the Russians have found the former easier to set afire. They have nicknamed it the "Ferdinand."

A Russian staff officer makes the following observations regarding the performance of the "Ferdinand" on the Orel and Belgorod fronts, where the Germans, counterattacking, used a number of the new heavy weapons and Pz. Kw. 6's as battering rams in an attempt to force breaches in the Russian lines.

¹ In *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. I, No. 12, p. 13, footnote 2 should read "Schrappnellmine—shrapnel mine." This is the full name for the German "S" mine, widely known to U. S. soldiers as the "bouncing baby."

² For a discussion of the Pz. Kw. 6, with illustrations, see *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. I, No. 10, pp. 19-23.




Figure 1a.—New German Heavy Self-propelled Gun (front view).




Figure 1b.—New German Heavy Self-propelled Gun (side and rear view).

During one battle the enemy assaulted our positions with 300 heavily armored vehicles, among which were about 50 "Tigers" and "Ferdinands." While the battle was taking place along our forward positions, 12 of our own heavy self-propelled guns remained hidden in their earth fortifications. When about 20 "Tigers" and "Ferdinands" broke through our forward lines, our self-propelled artillery moved out from their concealed positions in order to fire by direct laying. An ambush was prepared near the threatened area, and the pieces were camouflaged.

Fire against the German armor was commenced when the attacking vehicles were about 500 yards away from our cannon.

Our first rounds were successful. At 500 yards "Tigers" suffered gaping holes in their turret armor and side armor. At 300 yards we pierced their frontal armor, and blew their turrets clean off. Hits on the side armor at this range nearly split the vehicles in half. It was somewhat different with the "Ferdinands." Their armor—the front armor, in particular—was more difficult to pierce, but their tracks, suspension, and side and turret armor were no harder to damage and destroy than those of the "Tigers." The Germans lost a total of 12 "Tigers" and six "Ferdinands."

In another battle the same heavy armor of the enemy was engaged by our ordinary medium artillery, which used both special and regular ammunition. Three of our pieces were emplaced to form a triangle; they were reasonably far apart. This triangular disposition permitted unusually effective fire against "Ferdinands." Although the "Ferdinand's" fire is very accurate, its fixed turret does not permit it to shift its fire rapidly. When the gun is caught in a triangle, it is virtually helpless, because while it engages one cannon the other two take pot-shots at its vulnerable points. If the piece directly in front of a "Ferdinand" does not disclose its position by firing, the other two can usually dispose of the big gun with no loss to ourselves.

Obviously, it is not always possible for us to arrange a battery in a triangle. Therefore, we require the closest possible coopera-

tion between the pieces of a battery and also between neighboring batteries.

Point-blank fire from our medium tanks in ambush, armed only with the 45-mm cannon, has taken care of many "Tigers" and "Ferdinands," as have land mines, Molotov cocktails, and cannon fire from our fighter planes.

It is also reported that the circular hole in the rear of the "Ferdinand's" fighting compartment is extremely vulnerable. This hole provides room for the recoil and the ejection of shells. Russian observers state that grenades or Molotov cocktails thrown into this opening can put the vehicle out of action.

Note: As the *Intelligence Bulletin* goes to press, further information regarding the "Ferdinand" has been made available.

It is reported that the crews consist of six men: A gun commander (usually a lieutenant, who is either a tank man or an artilleryman), a gunner, a driver-mechanic, a radio operator, and two additional gun crew members.

"Ferdinands" are organized in battalions called "Heavy Tank-Destroyer Battalions." Each battalion consists of three gun companies, a headquarters company, a repair company, and a transport column. Each gun company consists of three platoons of four guns each. The company headquarters has three guns, making a total of 14 guns per company. The battalion headquarters company has two guns, a Pz. Kw. 3, and four motorcycles.

On the offensive, the battalion moves in two echelons. The first echelon consists of two companies abreast, with each company in line and with a 100-yard interval between guns. The second echelon consists of the third company, also in line. The distance between echelons has not been reported.

Although the gun itself is excellent, the mounting has certain pronounced defects. (1) The gun can fire only to the front, and is effective only when stationary. (2) Poor vision from the fighting compartment allows more maneuverable tanks and antitank weapons to get in close to the gun.

Section II. NOTES ON WINTER USE OF INFANTRY WEAPONS

1. INTRODUCTION

The following notes are based on directions issued by the German High Command regarding the use of German infantry weapons in winter. For complete descriptions of these weapons, with illustrations, the reader is referred to Special Series No. 14, "German Infantry Weapons," issued by M. I. D., W. D.

2. USE OF INFANTRY WEAPONS IN WINTER

a. General

The German Army is thoroughly aware that winter cold and snow necessitate special measures concerning the carrying, moving, and bringing into position of infantry weapons and ammunition. In this connection German soldiers are reminded of certain fundamental points: that noises travel farther in cold, clear air; that when snow obscures terrain features, there are decidedly fewer landmarks; and that, in winter, distances are generally estimated too short in clear weather and too far in mist. The German High Command adds several other practical suggestions:

It will be especially necessary to practice target designation, distance estimation, and ranging.

The rifleman and his weapons must be camouflaged thoroughly. White coats, white covers for headgear, and white overall trousers and jackets will be worn. When necessary, such outer clothing can easily be improvised out of white canvas. The simplest camouflage for weapons will be plain white cloth covers or coats of removable chalk; the former will have the added advantage of affording protection.

At low temperatures, the accompanying weapons of the infantry will fire somewhat short at first. After a few rounds, however, the range to the point of impact will be normal. Before a weapon is loaded, the loading movements should be practiced without ammunition. (In drilling with pistols, be sure to remove the magazine beforehand.)

b. Specific

(1) *Rifles*.—Rifles are carried on the back, or are hung from the neck and suspended in front. During long marches on skis, rifles are fastened on the side of the haversack.

When the German soldier goes into position, he takes special care not to allow his rifle barrel to become filled with snow. He does not take off the bolt protector and muzzle cap until shortly before he is to use the rifle. The various methods of going into position are practiced in drill.

As far as possible, telescopic sights are not exposed too suddenly to extreme changes in temperature.

(2) *Automatic Pistol*.—The Germans keep the automatic pistol well wrapped, and sling it around the neck or over the shoulder. Magazine pouches are closed very tightly.

(3) *Light Machine Gun*.—The light machine gun is slung on the back. In going into position, the Germans use brushwood or a “snow board” (see fig. 2) for a base. They take care not to disturb, by unnecessary trampling, the snow cover in front of positions. The purpose of this precaution is to avoid recognition by the opposing force.




Figure 2.—“Snow Board” Used as a Base for German Light Machine Gun in Firing Position.

The simplest kind of mat is taken along so that belts can be kept clear of snow.

The light machine gun is first shot until it is warm, and then is oiled.

When fire is continued for any length of time, the snow in front of the muzzle turns black; therefore, before the snow becomes blackened, the Germans decide upon prospective changes of position.

If there is to be a considerable interval after the firing of the machine gun, the bolt is changed and the oil is removed from the sliding parts. (Only an extremely thin oil film is allowed to remain.) This precludes stoppages which might be caused by the freezing of oil. The new bolt is given a very thin coat of oil before it is inserted.

Replacement ammunition, in pre-filled belts, is carried into action.

(4) *Heavy Machine Gun*.—The heavy machine gun is carried in the usual manner or is loaded on a small sleigh, skis, or a pulk. A pulk (see fig. 3) is a type of sled used by the Lapps; its front half somewhat resembles that of a rowboat.




Figure 3.—Pulk Used for Winter Transport of German Heavy Machine Gun.

When the Germans take the heavy machine gun into position, they use some sort of snow board, the pulk, or even a stretcher as a base. They take care not to disturb the snow in front of the position.

The Germans try not to expose the sights to temperatures of less than 6° F. During marches these sights are kept in their containers, and before they are used, they are gradually warmed in sheltered places or on the human body. The sights are kept mounted on the machine-gun carriage only while the gun is in active use.

Mats are carried so that belts may be kept clear of snow.

For shooting in extreme cold, German range tables provide for the necessary sight adjustments. The

heavy machine gun is first shot until it is warm, and then is oiled. New positions are decided upon before the snow in front of the muzzle becomes blackened.

The Germans prevent soiling of the machine gun, which leads to stoppages, (a) by keeping the antidust cover closed as much as possible, and (b) by not allowing the gun to remain loaded (with bolt backwards) for any length of time.

Speed is considered highly important in readying the gun for firing. While firing is in progress, the bolt remains uncocked in the forward position, the belt is inserted into the belt pawl, and the gunner, remaining in the firing position, withdraws the cocking slide only with a strong jerk and pushes it forward again.

(5) *General Rules for Firing the Mortar and Infantry Howitzers.*—Adjustment of fire is done only by very careful bracketing.

At low temperatures, the weapons fire somewhat short at first. After a few rounds the range to the point of impact becomes normal. Therefore, in adjustment of fire, the Germans start with a greater range than that ascertained.

When shooting from the same emplacement for any length of time, the Germans repeatedly throw fresh snow over the black spots in front of the muzzle to camouflage them.

(6) *Light Mortar.*—The light mortar is carried in the usual manner. In emplacing it, the Germans clear away the snow and dig into the ground. If the snow

is loose enough, the Germans fill sandbags with it or pack it down to form bases.

The Germans have found that the fragmentation effect of the mortar shells is diminished by deep snow.

Sights are wrapped in wool as a protection against extreme cold.

(7) *Light Infantry Howitzer*.—The light infantry howitzer is moved by spur wheel (horse-drawn) or on a simple sleigh, drawn by two horses or six men. When half-tracks or tractors are used, sled runners are placed under the front wheels.

When the ground is frozen solid, the guns in firing position are put on elastic bases whenever this is feasible. Brushwood fascines (bundles) are considered especially satisfactory. When the Germans are firing in deep snow, they use sled runners and snow plates or boards, or the largest commercially-produced snowshoes, to prevent the guns from sinking in. If one pair of snowshoes is not enough, two pairs are fastened together.

Since the march is generally confined to roads or trails, emplacements are usually set up in the route itself.

The Germans try to fire ricochet bursts. This is possible if there is loose snow (up to about 16 inches in depth) and frozen ground.

Sights are protected against extreme cold.

(8) *Heavy Infantry Howitzer*.—Movement in 6 to 8 inches of snow is not difficult on roads and trails.

For the rest, see (6) and (7).

(9) *37-mm Antitank Gun*.—In 6 to 8 inches of snow, the 37-mm antitank gun is drawn by a light five-passenger personnel carrier. When the gun is man-handled or horse-drawn, the Germans use a spur wheel and sled runners fixed underneath.

The emplacement is prepared in the same manner as that of the light infantry howitzer.

The front of the protective shield is painted white. When the gun is in the firing position, a cut-out board is placed underneath the trail.

To avoid blackening the snow with the first round, the weapon is not fired too low over snow cover.

(10) *50-mm Antitank Gun*.—In 6 to 8 inches of snow, the 50-mm antitank gun is drawn by a half-track prime mover on roads and trails only.

For the rest, see (9).

SECTION III. IMPROVEMENT OF DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

Last February Col. Gen. Jurgen von Arnim, then in command of the Fifth Panzer Army, issued from his headquarters in Tunis a significant order regarding the improvement of German defensive positions. This order not only touched on certain German weaknesses in the defense, but, in laying down methods by which they were to be corrected, showed a practical application of German doctrine to actual field problems.

At the beginning of the order, von Arnim said, "The improvement of positions still remains far below minimum requirements." He declared that temporary improvement of a position was not enough, and ordered that all defensive works be sited and built up (1) in anticipation of large-scale fighting, and (2) to provide concealment from hostile artillery and air observation. To insure uniform interpretation of his instructions, von Arnim summarized them in the following outline.

1. FORWARD BOUNDARY OF THE ORGANIZED DEFENSE AREA

a. Requirements

(1) The forward boundary of the organized defense area must enclose the various positions which will be decisive in the defense of the combat outpost area.

- (2) It must protect the most important observation posts.
- (3) It (the terrain at that point) should be as unfavorable as possible to hostile tanks seeking to reach the position.
- (4) It must remain in the hands of the defenders at all times.

b. How To Fulfill the Requirements

(1) The main dispositions should not be placed too near the forward boundary, lest hostile artillery fire reach them too easily. The majority of the automatic weapons should be forward. The riflemen should be behind them—removed from direct hostile fire and ready to counterattack. [See paragraph 2a (2) of this section.]

(2) The forward boundary of the organized defense area will be defended chiefly by fire from flank positions, which in turn are concealed from the hostile line and which will be protected by hand-grenade action against any frontal assault. Barbed wire is to be placed so far forward that a well dug-in enemy to the front cannot get within hand-grenade range of our foxholes.

(3) The selection of observation posts is decisive. These must have a field of observation which includes not only the forward boundary of the organized defense area, but the hostile outpost area, as well. These observation posts are not to be occupied initially; they will be occupied only at the start of a major action.

(4) Even if the hostile force does not at first place fire on our important positions, this is by no means an indication that it has not discovered them and will not concentrate on them at the beginning of the attack. Therefore, exercise caution when approaching the position, and especially within the position itself.

(5) Foot paths often reveal to hostile air observers an otherwise well camouflaged position (observation posts, command posts, field aid stations, and so on).

(6) Complete defense against hostile tanks must be insured by the prepared and coordinated employment of all means at our disposal: by mines (where antitank guns cannot be employed);

by antitank guns (where concealed gun positions and a good field of fire of 0-1000 yards are possible); and by artillery.

(7) The reinforced defensive positions should consist of a deep, narrow hole for every two men. Stone walls will not be used.

2. DEPTH OF THE DEFENSIVE POSITION

a. How Depth of the Position Is Achieved

A defensive position in depth is achieved by:

(1) All-around defense of all observation posts and of all platoon, company, battalion, and regimental command posts.

(2) The construction of defensive positions in the areas of units designated for the counterattack. See paragraph 1b (1). Consider the reserves on the unit boundaries.

(3) All-around defense of all firing positions (heavy machine guns, mortars, infantry howitzers, and artillery).

b. How Defense of the Position Is Insured

Defense of the position is insured by:

(1) Our ability to shift the fires of our heavy weapons and employ them against the hostile force after it has penetrated our lines, and our ability to lay down defensive fires in front of our own centers of resistance. This must be taken into account in the selection of observation posts and firing points.

(2) Communication with subordinate and higher units, and with command posts on the right and left as well as with forward outposts. The system of communication (telephonic or visual) must be so planned or improved that there will always be at least one means of communication functioning, even under heavy hostile fire. These communications are to be tested immediately and continuously improved, so that weaknesses can be determined and remedied.

(3) Security of the approach roads (concealed from the opposition), which may be used by the reserves in advancing to areas of counterattack against hostile penetrations. As soon as the opposition begins to lay down preparatory fires, these roads and

the projected assembly areas of the reserves must be inspected daily to make certain that they are situated in areas which are exposed to little or no hostile fire.

(4) The supply of the sectors and subsectors, each according to the capabilities of the established strong points, with ammunition, water, first-aid equipment, tobacco, and food. It must be insured that, even when there is a complete one-day failure of supply from rear to front, the defenders of strong points will remain in good fighting condition. In the event of an enemy penetration, the strong points which have not yet been surrounded are to be immediately supplied with ammunition from the still-unbroken front. Upon their ability to hold out depends the successful continuation of the battle and the rapid retaking of the lost parts of the organized defense area.

(5) The simultaneous cooperation of all supporting weapons against definite targets. Whenever the occasion permits, test firing will be conducted by the artillery and sector commanders. One round will be fired from each position upon a given command or at a definite time.

3. MAPS OR OVERLAYS

Maps or overlays will be made by regiments and higher units to indicate the following:

a. Minefields, including antitank-gun positions and effective fields of fire.

b. Command posts and observation posts (with the types of communication between them shown in color).

c. Especially advantageous observation posts (shown in different colors, with the terrain visible from each post always in the same color as the post itself).

d. Supply dumps (with munitions, water, and so on in different colors).

e. The positions of artillery, infantry guns, and mortars, including the fields of fire.

f. The principal areas in which hostile artillery fire will fall (shown on overlays).

Section IV. ROAD DISCIPLINE; ACTION BY ALL ARMS VS. PLANES

1. INTRODUCTION

The relation between the Germans' faulty road discipline and effective attacks on their columns by United Nations aircraft is thoroughly apparent to the German High Command. For some time the German Army has been attempting to remedy the unsatisfactory dispersion of its columns, both on the march and at halts. Also, as a natural corollary, it has been insisting on a vigorous defense against attacking aircraft by weapons of all arms. That German traffic posts and patrols in Tunisia allowed units to expose themselves needlessly was indicated by Field Marshal Rommel in January 1943, when he wrote the following order, which sharply expresses his opinion on this subject.

I personally have observed a considerable lack of traffic discipline, especially along the Via Balbia. I request the commanding generals, as well as the commanding officers of independent units, to remind their units again of the necessity for absolute compliance with traffic discipline.

Especially, I do not wish to see any columns halting or resting on the roads. Roads must under all circumstances be kept clear during any halt. This applies even to single vehicles. A congregation of motorized troops on roads is simply an impossible condition. Such an assembly must always be off the road, and the vehicles dispersed.

Those who disregard this order—or the forthcoming regulations for traffic discipline—will be very severely punished. I assure you that I will punish any violation that I may happen to see, insofar as it concerns members of the German Armed Forces.

2. SPECIFIC DISPERSAL REGULATIONS

The vulnerability of thickly clustered vehicles and tents was stressed by General von Arnim in April 1943, when he issued specific regulations designed to insure better dispersion and to reduce the casualties caused by United Nations aircraft. The von Arnim order, which follows, makes it clear that the German forces in North Africa had not been carrying out Marshal Rommel's instructions any too faithfully.

On my flights over the new positions today, I saw unbelievable sights, not only there, but stretching far to the rear. Vehicles and tents were huddled together in very small spaces, such as small woods, narrow draws and wadis, and so on. This inevitably increases the heavy casualties inflicted by hostile aircraft.

I order:

1. Tents must be 100 yards apart.
2. Vehicles must be parked away from a road, and must be 50 yards apart.
3. Only one vehicle may be parked near a house, and then only on the shady side.
4. When vehicles are obliged to halt briefly on a road, a distance of 30 feet between vehicles will be scrupulously maintained.
5. If vehicles parked on the side of a road overlap any part of the road itself, no further parking will be allowed, and no vehicles will be parked on the opposite side of the road.
6. When a motor convoy is parked, a traffic post must be established 30 yards ahead of the column, and another traffic post must be established 30 yards to the rear of the column.
7. Columns must not stop on bridges, on curves, or in towns; single vehicles may park on side streets in towns, but not on a main highway.

I require that all traffic posts and patrols be especially vigilant in carrying out the above regulations.

3. ALL ARMS VS. HOSTILE AIRCRAFT

a. General

Logical sequels to the foregoing orders regarding road discipline are the German Army memoranda reminding all arms that, once they are properly dispersed, they must use every means at their disposal to defend against attacks by hostile aircraft, and that even the infantry rifleman must be prepared to deliver fire against low-flying planes. The extracts which follow have been taken from several German Army memoranda, but have been rearranged for easier reference, under the headings "Self-protection," "Standard Procedure for Firing," and "Rifle Fire against Low-flying Aircraft."

b. Self-protection

(1) The activity of the opposing air units is directed against all the resources of the German Armed Forces. It is therefore the duty of all soldiers of all arms to combat hostile planes.

(2) Hostile aircraft can attack only when they can see you, your weapon, your vehicle, or your tent. Avoid being detected from the air. The best way to keep from being seen is to blend yourself with the natural surroundings—in other words, remember the value of camouflage.

(3) Incomplete camouflage is better than none. But bad camouflage—that is, employing contrasting colors or creating telltale shadows—is much more dangerous than no camouflage at all. Shadows and contrasting colors are the first things that attract the attention of aircraft.

Camouflage must be changed continually, in accordance with the surroundings, the weather, and even the time of day. Moreover, the individual is responsible not only for himself, but for

cooperating with his fellow soldiers to maintain perfect camouflage.

(4) On marches, at halts, in rest areas, while alerted, when attacking, or when defending—the leader must remember to keep his units deployed, to disperse columns and marching groups, and to maintain a proper distance between groups, as well as dispersal to the flanks. The preparation of gun emplacements for heavy weapons, as well as the work of readying assault guns, tanks, and other vehicles for combat, must be carried out near woods, groves, or orchards, beside haystacks, in town alleys or gardens, or wherever the surroundings suggest a practical camouflage plan.

(5) Marches and other movements, even those of small units, should be executed at night as much as possible. Do not permit crowds to form. Never permit halts at crossroads, squares, or narrow places. Maintain strict blackout discipline. If the opposition releases flares, stop marching, halt all vehicles, and hold draft and pack animals—allow nothing whatever to move.

(6) Bombing and strafing by hostile planes cannot be successful if you have dug adequate cover against fragmentation. This goes for you, your weapon, and your vehicle. Remember to dig foxholes when you are engaged in tactical situations—even when you are in transit, and your halt for work or rest is temporary. Never dig a foxhole beneath any vehicle other than a tank.

c. Standard Procedure for Firing

(1) On marches the leader will assign at least one man per platoon as an air sentry. If troops are transported by carrier, at least one air sentry per carrier will be assigned.

(2) Twenty-millimeter self-propelled anti-aircraft guns will always be ready for combat. Motorized troops must have their anti-aircraft machine guns on the trucks and ready for combat. Rifles will always be kept at hand and ammunition will be distributed.

(3) Weapons must be camouflaged. Fire only if a hostile plane is within range of your weapons.

(4) If an air attack is imminent, cannoneers will not leave the "azimuth-setter" seat; machine gunners will not leave their posts.

(5) Cannoneers and gunners will not be used as air sentries.

(6) Each target must be combatted by weapons of several types. Designate a gun or machine gun to be on the alert so that fire can be opened at a moment's notice. Fire should be concentrated on the target by platoons or by machine-gun squads.

(7) Keep calm. Act cautiously, but quickly, to repulse all attacks. There must be no such thing as "air terror."

d. Rifle Fire against Low-flying Aircraft

Although attacks by low-flying aircraft have repeatedly caused serious losses, units often fail to take advantage of their opportunities to destroy hostile planes. Lack of any kind of defense merely makes it easier for these aircraft to accomplish their missions.

It has been proved that rifle fire can cause attacking planes heavy losses in men and matériel. Aircraft are very fragile, and may be grounded for a considerable time by hits in the motor, fuel tank, magazine, cable, and so on. You accomplish an important defensive purpose, then, when you prevent a pilot from directing his fire properly or when you damage his plane.

Hostile pursuit bombers frequently approach at a low level and start to gain altitude only just before they attack. When they do this, they cannot be picked up by our air-raid warning sentries early enough to permit our own fighters to arrive in time. Under these circumstances, the fire of rifles and other weapons not otherwise employed in the ground fight must be concentrated against the attacking aircraft.

It is best to open with a salvo, and to follow this with rapid rifle fire. The object is to greet the attacker with a cone of flying steel.

Rifle fire directed against aircraft flying at an altitude of more than 600 yards is ineffective, and serves only to give away one's own position.

No aircraft is invulnerable. Therefore, in line with the classic principle that attack is the best defense, every German soldier must be indoctrinated with the determination to shoot the attacker out of the sky.

Section V. STREET FIGHTING BY PANZER GRENADIERS

German Panzer Grenadiers (armored infantry) are given extensive training in street fighting. Cooperating with tank units, the Panzer Grenadiers are often employed for the close-in combat that is required when the Germans wish to put an end to all resistance within a town—generally one which has been, or is being, encircled. The following extracts are from a Panzer Grenadier lieutenant's account of such an action. In spite of its Nazi point of view and its heightened style, it is interesting as an illustration of Panzer Grenadier activity. The action the lieutenant describes takes place on the Eastern Front. A well-deployed tank battalion, followed by a Panzer Grenadier company riding in armored personnel carriers, is advancing across the plains of the Ukraine.

A Russian force has been encircled, and the task for today is to drive through the center of the pocket and divide the Russians into still smaller groups, which can be destroyed separately. As yet, no rounds have been fired, but the tanks ahead of us may come upon the hostile force at any moment. The company commander glances at his platoons; they are following in considerable depth and width. The distance between vehicles is at least 50 feet, the radios are set for reception, and everything is in order. It is very hot, and there is a haze.

The men in the tanks ahead can see a village in the distance. According to the map, this should be Krutojarka. Guns can be seen flashing at the edge of the village. The Russian force is engaged. We hear the fire of Russian antitank guns and our own tank cannon, and, in between, the sound of both sides' machine-gun fire. The Panzer Grenadier company commander gives his command by radio. As soon as the grenadiers see Russian soldiers, they are to fire on them directly from the personnel carriers, or else dismount quickly and fight on the ground, depending on the requirements of the moment.

The first tanks enter Krutojarka, but presently reappear. The company commander gives the radio command. "Krutojarka is being held by the enemy. Clear the town!" The personnel carriers advance past the tanks, which are firing with all their guns, and move toward the edge of the village.

A personnel carrier's tread is hit by a flanking antitank gun. The grenadiers jump out and assault the antitank-gun crew with machine-gun fire, while the driver and the man beside him get out and, under fire, change the broken link of the tread.

The attacking grenadiers have now reached a street at the edge of the village. Startled by the suddenness of the assault, the Russians take cover in houses, bunkers, foxholes, and other hide-outs. The grenadiers jump out of the personnel carriers and advance along the street, making good use of grenades, pistols, and bayonets [see cover illustration]. The driver and a second man remain in each carrier.

The personnel carriers skirt around the sides of the village, with the men beside the drivers delivering flanking fire against the buildings. Soon the roofs of the houses are afire. The smoke grows thicker and thicker.

Three tanks push forward along the main street of the village, to support the attack of the grenadiers. We find the smoke an advantage, for it prevents the Russians from discovering that there are relatively few of us. Also, as a result of the poor visibility, the Russians cannot employ their numerous machine

guns with full effect. We, for our part, are able to engage in the close-in fighting at which we excel. It is no longer possible to have one command for the company. Officers and noncoms have formed small shock detachments, which advance from street corner to street corner, and from bunker to ditch, eliminating one Russian nest after another.

A lieutenant holds a grenade until it almost explodes in his hands, and then throws it into a bunker. It explodes in the firing hatch, and enemy soldiers stream out.

The company commander discovers a 37-mm Russian antiaircraft machine gun, and sits down on the saddle. Two men who are with him attack the magazines, which are lying about. Although the commander has never fired this type of cannon before, he succeeds in demoralizing the Russians with its high-explosive projectiles. We take many more prisoners.

When about half the village is in our hands, and when we have captured the Russian commander and his political commissar,¹ resistance collapses. All prisoners are marched to the rear, and the booty of guns and vehicles is collected. The Panzer Grenadiers advance to the far end of the village, where they climb into the waiting personnel carriers. Most of the tank battalion also has skirted the village, and already has moved further east. Anticipating further action, the Panzer Grenadiers again follow the tanks.

¹ Since this account was written, the Russians have discontinued their practice of assigning political commissars to accompany Red Army units.

Section VI. THE GERMANS IN COMBAT— AS SEEN BY THE BRITISH

In a series of informal discussions, a number of British officers and enlisted men who fought the Germans in Tunisia have made useful comments on German combat methods—and on certain British procedures, as well. Some of these soldiers were experienced, but many had just seen action for the first time. The following extracts from their remarks will be of special interest to U. S. soldiers who have not yet faced the Germans in battle.

Adjutant, Parachute Battalion:

The Germans have a habit of shifting their positions daily. We were badly “had” because of this. Sometimes we had to carry 3-inch mortars 10 miles across country, and then, when we shelled a place where the Germans were supposed to be, we found that they had moved. As a result, we merely gave away our own position

The Germans didn’t seem to do much night patrolling. At first, we had very little difficulty in taking them by surprise. One of our parachutists got up to a farmhouse where there were a lot of Jerries. He planted a bomb in a room where they were sleeping, and got out without waking anyone. A Jerry stopped him in the passage outside and said, “What are you doing here?” Our man stuck a gun in the Jerry’s ribs and explained the situ-

ation. Our parachute blouse is very much like the German uniform, and this German wouldn't believe it wasn't all a joke—until he was shot.

By the way, here's a point I'd like to stress: if you're going up a hill where Germans have been, look out for mines set with pull-igniters. The Germans plaster the place with them.

Lieutenant, Field Co., Royal Engineers:

Our job was mainly lifting and laying mines, building battalion positions, and marking roads with white stones and so on, to make night driving easier. What a lot of people don't realize is that under these conditions all headlights are forbidden and that all movement must be done at night. Thanks largely to all the road marking, the accident rate wasn't bad.

We also spent a lot of time checking against maps. By the way, we soon found out that the thickness of a road line on the map doesn't necessarily have any relation to the width or quality of the actual road itself.

In the future one thing I'm going to concentrate on like hell is night training. Most work in connection with mines and bridges is done at night. We found it absolutely necessary, when close to the enemy, to have some means of looking at maps without showing a light. In an attempt to solve this problem, we devised a portable case (see fig. 4). It's very simple—just a "compo" ration-box lid, with a wire framework supporting a little canvas tent affair, which has two eyeholes and two armholes. A flashlight is clamped into a wooden cross-bar support at the back. We found the whole thing extremely practical

Trip wires leading to mines are a hell of a problem. The Germans like to place them in underbrush. During a march, your legs and feet get less and less sensitive to what they brush against, and if you aren't alert you're likely to crash into a trip wire and detonate a mine—very likely an "S" mine set with a pull-igniter.




Figure 4.—Portable Device for Map Reading at Night.

Battery Commander, Royal Artillery:

Gunners should give more thought to the question of defending themselves. Ninety percent of the time, gunners are without infantry protection, whether in battle or on the road. This point becomes very significant when you are continually threatened by German patrols at night. Gunners have a great tendency to attract the Germans' attention by talking. The Germans creep up, sling a few grenades, and get away. My men weren't guilty of this, but I know of a number in other batteries who were.

German shelling soon taught us the necessity for improving our gun-pit digging.

Company Commander, Hampshire Regiment:

It's difficult to know what to do when the Germans give themselves up during an attack. You'd sometimes find that half a group would go on firing, while half were making signs of surrender.

You've got to watch out that the ones who raise their hands to surrender don't pick up their rifles and fire at your back when you've gone past them.

The Germans move about more than we do. We seem to be rather static-minded. The Germans will occupy a position and then leave it for an entire day and night, but this doesn't necessarily mean that they don't intend to come back

Private, Parachute Battalion:

There were two small woods, one behind the other, about a mile in front of our lines. The nearer one was reported clear, but the other was supposed to be used by a German platoon coming up to patrol at night. Our platoon was sent out as a combat patrol.

We went by the route marked on the map (see fig. 5). The ground was covered with low bushes, so we couldn't help making a certain amount of noise. Even so, we were able to come quite close to two German sentries, whom we found in the first woods—




Figure 5.

to our great surprise. We got down and listened. We could hear the sentries walking about and talking. They were pretty careless. One kept blowing his nose. I should say that they were just the other side of the hedge, within about 15 yards of us.

If they had been more wide-awake, they would have had us cold. The mere fact that they were there at all was unpleasant enough for us. We weren't expecting to meet them until we got to the second wood, but here they were in the first. Then we heard another bunch on the other flank, making enough noise to indicate much greater strength than our platoon could profitably attack. So we retired.

One thing this experience taught me is that you can't always rely on information brought in by a patrol the night before.

Gunner, Royal Artillery:

I used to laugh at slit trenches, but at a particular place one saved my life. We had dug a good deep slit trench beside our gun. It was just getting dark, and we had fired the last round of the day, when two Ju 88's spotted us. The battery executive yelled, "Get into the slit trenches." Most of us were fortunate and got in quickly. The others, I'm sorry to say, were either killed or wounded. So the narrower and deeper the slit trench, the better.

Private, Parachute Battalion:

The Germans knew approximately where we were, but they didn't know our exact position. There were a lot of dead bodies lying about, and some of the boys started looking for loot—revolvers, binoculars, and so on. The Germans got our exact position, of course, and gave us hell with mortars, killing nearly every man. So here's a piece of advice: leave the loot alone, and don't move about where the Germans can see you—they're sure to give you hell if you do.

Private, Infantry Battalion:

We were to start the big attack on the main Tunis road at early morning on 22 April, but the Germans attacked us at dawn on the 21st. We were in a wadi, when we were surprised by about 30 Germans. They were very good soldiers, too. How they got around our forward company, which was A Company, nobody knows. But this put them right between A Company forward and battalion headquarters, which was in the wadi with all our tracked vehicles.

The enemy was occupying our observation post, which was about 900 yards from battalion headquarters. Our C. O. sent C Company into the attack, but they couldn't move the Germans, who were holding a forward slope. So the C. O. had the mortar platoon lay a smoke screen while C Company withdrew. However, he also placed his light machine guns out and sent in B and D companies, with bayonets fixed. I had read about the Jerries not liking the sight of cold steel, and it turned out to be true—they were putting up their hands before our company was within 50 yards of them. It was a grand sight to see our men going in with the charge, which I saw from the wadi, as I was with the Antitank back at headquarters.

Then the second-in-command sent down for four drivers to bring in four trucks left behind by the Germans. We went over the top of the hill, from which the Jerries had been moved, and we could see the trucks about 400 yards away. When we were within 10 yards of them, an enemy machine gun and snipers suddenly opened up. They got my chum. Seeing no cover, I dropped down in the tall grass. Probably because I remembered what I had been taught about crawling, I'm here to tell the story.

Section VII. MISCELLANEOUS

1. TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF AT WEAPONS

Toward the end of the Tunisian campaign, Major General Weber, who was in command of the 334th German Infantry Division, issued this extremely interesting order regarding the tactical employment of antitank weapons.

The opposition uses its tanks as assault guns, with the help of which it pushes its infantry forward. In general practice, the opposition does not attempt to make a breakthrough with armored vehicles, but tries to nibble forward, on a broad front, through the main defensive positions. Hostile tanks must therefore be knocked out during the initial penetration, so that the hostile infantry will lose its artillery support. To this end, all antitank weapons—such as antitank guns, antiaircraft guns, and tank guns—are to be placed under the command of the infantry sector commanders, who will site them well forward in the fire plan. In addition, all antitank weapons are to be made into strong points, to permit all-around defense against both tanks and infantry. As these strong points, cleverly sited so as to give flanking fire support, begin to knock out tanks and armored cars, the whole attack will gradually be brought to a standstill.

2. "ENGLISH SPOKEN HERE"

German field patrols often call out familiar Christian names in English, hoping to locate Allied positions.

(This has also been a favorite ruse of the Japanese.) German tanks sometimes stop and open their hatches, whereupon a German soldier says in English, "It's all up—no use fighting—get up and come forward," or similar phrases. This, again, is a trick by which the Germans hope to locate positions. If, in such instances, U. S. soldiers suspect a ruse and keep well down, they are likely to be rewarded by hearing the Germans close the tank hatch and move along to try the same stunt elsewhere.

3. SMOKE GENERATORS ON TANKS

The Germans are using a new type of smoke discharger on the Pz. Kw. 6 and on the latest models of the Pz. Kw. 3.

On each side of the turret, three external dischargers are mounted, one above the other, at a fixed elevation of 45 degrees. However, the dischargers on each side are not in line vertically, but from bottom to top are slightly tilted outward to insure a fanwise projection of the smoke generators and therefore a better smoke screen in front of the vehicle.

Each discharger is a cylindrical tube 3.7 inches in diameter and about 6 inches long. The base of each discharger is closed by a heavy-gauge sheet metal bracket, by which the unit of three dischargers is attached to the turret. The equipment is fired electrically from the interior of the turret.

4. BOOBY TRAPS

Recently the following German booby traps have been reported:

a. A Tellermine propped in a tree by means of a long pole. A pull-igniter was screwed into the mine, and wire led from the igniter to a second branch. The idea presumably was that when someone disturbed the pole, the mine would fall and explode in mid-air.

b. A 3-kilogram prepared charge, with a pull-igniter attached to the carrying straps in such a way that anyone lifting the charge by the straps would detonate it.

c. A small cake of what appeared to be cream-colored soap, with the brand name "Bourgeois" on one side and "Made in England" on the other. (When it was placed in a can of water, there was no apparent reaction during the first 24 hours, but on the second day it separated in half, as if a seam had opened. The cake seemed to have some kind of metallic core. When a concussion charge was fired 6 inches from the can, there was a sympathetic detonation of considerable violence, and the bottom of the can was entirely blown out.)

PART TWO: JAPAN

Section I. COMBINED ATTU REPORTS ON JAPANESE WARFARE

1. INTRODUCTION

This section has been compiled from various intelligence reports submitted by U. S. observers during the operations on Attu Island. A preliminary report on the Attu operations was published in *Intelligence Bulletin*, Volume I, No. 11. Except for isolated instances, none of the information in the preliminary report is repeated below.

2. INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS

With few exceptions, the individual Japanese soldier on Attu lived up to all our expectations. He was tough, active, tricky, and treacherous, but absolutely no "superman." He was subject to fear, to confusion, and to thoughtless acts of desperation. As a rule, however, he could be counted on to fight to the last.

For example, when about to be forced from a position, the Japanese often would counterattack instead of retreat. Inasmuch as these counterattacks were not well coordinated, they were welcomed by our

troops, who were able to down the enemy in great numbers. The Japanese pressed forward regardless of losses until practically all were exterminated. (Some of them, under great pressure, committed suicide.)

This willingness of the enemy to fight to the death was manifested even in the cleanup period following the battle. In the thick of the fighting, every pile of wounded and dead had to be examined for men feigning death, and awaiting only the opportunity to snipe or throw grenades at some of our men, including hospital personnel seeking to give assistance.

However, in spite of their fanaticism and willingness to fight until killed, Japanese soldiers apparently are still human. Several Attu observers reported that when we had fire superiority, the enemy usually kept their heads down. Their morale was greatly affected by our mortar and artillery fire. The Japanese also showed a fear of our bayonet attacks.

Regarding the characteristics of the individual Japanese soldier, a U. S. platoon leader says:

I feel very definitely that if a continual advance is made on the Jap, he becomes confused and doesn't quite know what to do next. One thing is certain. This business about his being a superman is so much tripe. When you start giving him the real business, he will run like hell and be twice as scared as you are—and when I think how scared I was, that's saying a lot.

3. DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

a. General

As a rule, the Japanese on Attu organized their defensive positions on high ground which ordinarily (1) afforded plunging fire on the flanks and rear of forces pushing inland from the coast, (2) was extremely to moderately hard to reach, (3) was largely secure from our naval fire and aerial strafing, and (4) was extremely hard to observe from the valley lowlands.

The enemy apparently organized the terrain so that they could obtain the best possible performance from each rifle and automatic weapon. Positions frequently were located high in side gullies. Trenches or tunnels (sometimes both) usually connected foxholes, rifle bays, and automatic-weapon positions, so that a single rifleman or automatic weapon man might have several fields of fire and several positions. These enabled the Japanese to take up a new position when, or before, an occupied position became untenable. Such shifting about tended to deceive our troops with respect to the enemy's strength.

The foxholes, trenches, and bays commanding the flanks and rear of inward-pushing forces were far more numerous than the positions set up for frontal defense. Trenches, of the zigzag type, usually were about 75 yards long, 3 feet wide, and 4 to 5 feet deep.

Broadly speaking, the Japanese did not organize a series of strong points, as we conceive it, but organized the terrain into scattered and frequently isolated

strong points which were very loosely tied together with supporting fires. In selecting these strong points, the enemy apparently paid little attention to routes for withdrawals. This was particularly true in the case of machine-gun positions.

Sometimes holes which, at a distance, appeared to be foxholes turned out to be entrances to large dugouts, living quarters, caches for supplies, or tunnels to observation posts or machine-gun positions. In several instances, trenches covered overhead with timber, dirt, and other forms of camouflage were constructed so as to connect buildings with gun emplacements.

In many cases small prepared positions for riflemen and machine gunners were found near large rocks, under the walls of cliffs, and in other naturally protected areas.

b. Machine Guns

As a rule, the Japanese emplacement of machine guns was good with respect to mutual support. The guns were seldom placed alone. Each was supported by at least one other gun, generally located from 200 to 500 yards away. This made their reduction more difficult as all the weapons had to be taken at once—otherwise, the first gun position taken would receive prompt support from other positions. In at least one instance, this support was strengthened by the addition of a rapid-fire cannon, which twice forced our troops to withdraw under fire after they had taken a machine-gun position. Also, grenade dischargers were frequently located near machine guns.

Often machine-gun positions were constructed either of blocks of tundra—which offered good concealment but poor protection—or of small and medium-sized rocks piled upon each other. Such positions along the rocky ridge tops afforded good camouflage but, once discovered, were deadly to the occupants because of rock fragments. Several Japanese bodies in these positions showed evidence that flying pieces of rock had caused deaths.

c. Sniper and Observation Posts

Sniper and observation posts were well located with respect to the terrain. They had no paths leading to them, and were well camouflaged with grass and, in some instances, turf and moss. A few of these posts had a T-shaped stick, about 3 feet high, which apparently was used as a rest for field glasses. The Japanese sniper or sentry apparently approached his post from a different direction each time he reported. Relief parties did not come close to the post.

4. DEFENSIVE TACTICS

a. General

By siting their weapons on high ground, the Japanese secured maximum fields of fire and excellent opportunities for long-range fire. They utilized both advantages. Most of their fire came at us from ranges of 1,000 yards or more. Some of the enemy's heavy machine guns were equipped with telescopic sights for long ranges, up to 2,500 yards.

This long-distance fire, delivered from high, well-concealed positions, was plunging steeply when it reached our troops, and frequently pinned them down. Except for its harassing value, this fire was not considered effective. The enemy's rifles and machine guns had no grazing fire at such long ranges, and the cones of fire were too dispersed to be effective against individuals. Also, the opening of fire at such long ranges gave our forces a pretty good idea as to the location of the Japanese positions.

b. Machine Guns

In addition to siting their machine guns well, the Japanese also had prepared elaborate range cards for firing. Apparently many of the guns had been registered carefully on terrain features before our troops went ashore, and had been laid on specific ground areas with planned patterns of mutually supporting cross fire. In many cases the enemy guns on ridges were set to search out every hollow in certain valley areas. Small range and deflection stakes were often found in front of enemy positions. This arrangement permitted the Japanese to open well-aimed fire, regardless of visibility.

As our troops advanced close to the Japanese positions, the hostile fire frequently was high—probably because many of the enemy gunners forgot to change their sights.

c. Use of Bayonets

Despite the fact that the Japanese place considerable emphasis on the use of cold steel in training, on Attu the enemy gave a poor performance with the bayonet, as a rule. Some observers believed the enemy may have feared our generally larger stature and, presumably, greater physical strength.

d. Communication

The Japanese placed great emphasis on the disruption of our communication facilities. Our soldiers could traverse wide areas known to be infested by enemy snipers, without being fired upon. However, when a soldier stopped for the apparent purpose of repairing telephone wire, snipers' bullets would begin to whine all around him. In the final all-out enemy attack, bayonets severed our wires in certain areas at an average interval of 20 feet, and rearward communications were disrupted. In some cases, enemy bayonets scratched the insulation off our wires in order to ground the circuits.

5. CAMOUFLAGE

a. General

Japanese camouflage on Attu was excellent. The enemy relied mainly on natural material, such as grass, moss, and limbs of dwarf pussy willow trees. Other materials included the usual camouflage nets for the body and head, camouflage capes, strips of rice-straw matting and grass matting, rope matting, dummy men and guns, and white snow parkas (some observers re-

ported that white wrap-around snow pants also were used).

b. Natural Material

Individual hillside positions for Japanese soldiers were usually shielded by pussy willow branches. These were draped with moss and tufts of grass which almost completely hid the opening.

Tufts of grass were used to mask the narrow slits (for observation and firing) of covered positions. The outlines and shadows of these positions were broken up by tufts of grass which were loosely twisted into ropes. Sometimes rice straw was used in making the ropes. Straw matting also was used, to cover openings or excavations.

All of these types of camouflage were generally used on one-man structures, while the principles of limiting shadows and of reducing silhouette elevation to a minimum were also generally well utilized.

c. Rope

Rope $\frac{1}{2}$ inch in diameter was found in large quantities. In utilizing it for camouflage, the Japanese opened the rope strands—as in splicing—placed tufts of compressed grass between the strands, fluffed them out, and then twisted the strands of rope back into place. The tufts of grass were 15 to 18 inches long and 1 inch in diameter.

After camouflaging a rope in the above manner, the Japanese coiled it up, or put it into immediate use by tossing a coil over the object to be camouflaged. This

and other coils were then crisscrossed and secured until the camouflage operation had been completed.

d. Wearing Apparel

The individual camouflage nets were made of varicolored netting. Wisps of similarly dyed raffia (strong fibrous strands from the leaf stalks of raffia palm trees) were tied into the string meshes of each section.

Individual nets frequently were laced together to cover conical tents. In many instances high revetments were built around the tents, and the camouflage nets fell at a gentle angle from the peak of the tent to the revetment wall. The practice of locating tents at the bottom of deep and almost inaccessible ravines provided an additional safeguard.

The white snow parkas were used for wearing above the snow line. Where possible, the enemy avoided travel across snow patches during the day unless clad in white clothing. When the enemy soldiers moved across the pale grass of the hillsides they often moved in a crouching position with strips of grass matting held in front of them.

Individual enemy riflemen and observers were supplied with hooded camouflage capes, which were made of light, rain-repellant tan paper. The capes were about 9 by 6 feet, and were tied with tie strings. Behind and under these capes, riflemen and observers could sit for a day at a time, dry and protected from wind and rain and indistinguishable from the tundra.

e. Installations

As a rule, the Japanese constructed cooking and storage chambers, latrines, and bath houses by cutting into the sides of hills or banks. They made these structures blend with the surrounding terrain by grass covers, grass or straw, willow branches, and sometimes turf.

Office buildings, barracks, officers' quarters, radio installations, and hospitals in the more developed centers were generally constructed with only the roof extending above ground level (barabara type). The roofs had low peaks, casting only small shadows. The tops of these roofs were covered with sod, which formed a green carpet over each gable. The sod also helped to shed the rain, and gave limited protection from fragments of shells bursting nearby. Glass windows inserted near the gables as skylights were covered on top with loosely strewn grass to prevent daytime detection, while blackout curtains covered the windows at night.

The Japanese went some distance from the building to dig up sod for covering the roofs. The denuded areas left after the sod was removed were rectangular. It is believed that the enemy prepared the areas in this manner with the belief that the contrasting color would befuddle our air observers.

Similar deceptive techniques were used in outlining entire trench systems, where only the surface sod was removed to reveal the dark earth.

Foxholes and machine-gun nests dug in snow-covered ground were covered with white cloths which blended perfectly with the snow.

Frequently small mounds of dirt were built in front of foxholes and covered with tundra. This made it impossible to see the foxholes from a lower elevation.

f. Dummy Emplacements

Islands at the entrance to Chicagof harbor contained complete dummy emplacements, including wooden guns and straw men (made by stuffing salvage uniforms with dry grass).

6. DEVELOPMENTS IN WEAPONS

Several Japanese "barrage" mortars, a comparatively new weapon, were captured on Attu. The mortar previously had been reported in the South Pacific theater. It was also noted on Attu that the enemy has made slight changes in hand grenades and the Model 89 grenade discharger.

a. "Barrage" Mortar

(1) *Description*.—The "barrage" mortar (see fig. 6) is a simply designed weapon for area bombardment. It consists of a smooth-bore tube, approximately 70-mm in diameter and 4 feet long; a base plate, a rectangular wooden block, and an iron rod, which holds the mortar in an upright position and controls the angle of elevation for firing. The wooden block, 12 inches long, 10 inches wide, and 8 inches thick, is used to absorb the shock during firing and to prevent the base plate from digging into the ground. The base plate is fastened to the block by two bolts. The iron rod, about 1 inch in diameter and 18 inches long, is fastened to the bottom of the block and extends straight down.

The elevation or depression of the mortar is determined solely by the angle at which the rod is stuck into the ground. The weapon apparently has no range-control device.

The tube of the mortar screws onto the base plate, which has a threaded male fitting. The firing pin protrudes upward from the center of this base fitting.

The shell used in the mortar has an over-all length of $10\frac{3}{4}$ inches and a diameter of $2\frac{3}{4}$ inches (see fig. 7). It is made of steel, is cylindrical in shape, and is painted




Figure 6.—Japanese "Barrage" Mortar.

black. The nose of the shell is capped by a rounded wooden disk on a metal base, and is secured to the casing by six rivets. A red band is painted around the shell just below a wooden cap.

The shell is divided into three main sections, namely:

(a) Base section, which houses a central percussion cap and explosive charges (in silk bags) for propelling the shell from the mortar;

(b) Central section, which houses powder delay trains and secondary charges of black powder for expelling seven bomb containers; and




Figure 7.—Shell for Japanese "Barrage" Mortar. (Part *a* shows the details of the bomb; part *b* illustrates the three phases of action which occur in the air after the mortar is fired; and *c* is a view of the shell as a whole.)

(c) Top section, which carries a silk parachute 12 inches in diameter and the seven bomb containers. (The parachute is fastened to a 6-foot-long cord, the other end of which is secured to the inside bottom of the casing.)

Each of the bomb containers, which are made of steel, has a $4\frac{1}{2}$ -inch square silk parachute fitted neatly into it. Also housed in each container is a steel tube bomb $3\frac{1}{4}$ inches long and $1\frac{1}{16}$ inch in diameter. The tube is filled with explosive, and is covered at the open end by a screw cap, which has a hole in its center for the passage of a cord fitted with a phosphorus igniter. The cord is 6 feet long. Its free end is attached to a rice-paper parachute which is 15 inches in diameter.

The seven bombs are marked similar to the mortar shell—they are painted black except for a red band below the screw cap. The bombs also bear the Japanese inscription “Dangerous—don’t touch.”

(2) *Operation*.—When the shell is dropped into the mortar tube, its primer falls against the firing pin and activates the propelling charge. In addition to shooting the shell from the tube, the explosion of the propelling charge also fires a delay powder train.

This delay train burns momentarily until it reaches powder charges, the explosion of which expels, in mid-air, the seven bomb containers and the silk parachute housed in the top section. This parachute apparently is designed to check the speed of the shell and throw it violently off its course, so that the bomb containers, with their small silk parachutes, may be scattered without tangling up.

The explosion of the charges that expel the bomb containers also activates powder delay trains in each of the bomb containers. These burning delay trains then explode expelling charges in the base of each container and force the bombs, each with its rice-paper parachute, from their containers. In the case of each bomb, the jerk caused by the opening of its parachute activates the phosphorus igniter which, in turn, causes the bomb to detonate.

Figure 7b illustrates three phases which are involved in the firing of this mortar shell. Summing up, it will be noted that, after activation of the expelling charges in the bomb containers, there are—at least momentarily—15 different elements air-borne by parachutes, namely: the shell casing, the seven bomb containers, and the seven bombs.

(3) *Purpose*.—The explosive content in the bombs is believed capable of producing a heavy detonation which would shatter the light casing into small fragments—too small to have any antipersonnel effect unless the bombs detonated close to personnel.

The warning inscribed on the bomb suggests that it may also be designed for use as a booby trap. In this case, the blast effect would be highly dangerous.

If necessary to handle an unexploded bomb, the following safety precautions should be observed:

(a) Do not lift the bomb without lifting the parachute at the same time, or vice versa.

(b) Unscrew the cap only when the cord is slack.

(c) Dispose of the phosphorus match composition by placing it in water or by burning it after separation from the bomb.

b. Hand Grenades

The hand grenades inspected on Attu have an additional safety feature. The new safety is a small, loosely set screw which fits into the fuze at the top—underneath the cap. To arm the grenades found on Attu, it was necessary to turn the screw about 180°.

Strewn about most of the captured Japanese positions were a number of hand grenades with their pins pulled out. Since the pins have to be withdrawn and the grenade hit sharply on a hard object before it will explode, the enemy may have removed the pins in order to have the weapons in a better state of readiness. Also, the pins may have been removed so that the grenades could serve as booby traps. In this case, the Japanese probably hoped that unwary U. S. soldiers would stumble onto the grenades, and accidentally kick the fuzes with enough force to cause detonation of the weapons.

c. Grenade Dischargers

The Model 89 grenade dischargers examined on Attu had a small bubble leveling device attached to the right side of the breech. The device indicates the angle at which the discharger is held, and thus enables the operator, or operators, to maintain a constant angle of fire.

The projectile used in this grenade penetrates fairly deep into soft ground before the fuze, which has a slight delay element, is activated. This delay considerably restricted the effective bursting area of the shell.

7. NOTES ON EQUIPMENT

a. For the Individual Soldier

(1) *Packs*.—Apparently the Japanese use their standard pack in all climates. It is only slightly larger than the U. S. canvas field bag, and will probably hold only rations, a change of socks, and perhaps a change of underwear. However, the pack is designed so that other articles may be strapped on. Several packs found ready for carrying had a blanket and wool overcoat in separate horseshoe-shape rolls, an extra pair of shoes, a shelter half, poles and pins, and felt leggings. As a whole it was a fairly comfortable pack.

(2) *Shelter Half*.—The Japanese shelter half is a light-weight tarpaulin about $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet square. It is sometimes pitched like our own, with another to form a pup tent. The halves have no buttons; they are laced together. The pup tent is open at both ends. A segmented, or foldable, pole is supplied with each shelter half. Usually Japanese soldiers simply cover themselves in a foxhole with their own shelter half.

(3) *Cartridge Pouch*.—The Japanese cartridge pouch is made of laminated duck, which has been thoroughly impregnated with rubber to give it a certain amount of rigidity and yet allow for resilience. The arrangement used to effect a snap closure is simply a buttonhole over

a collar-button type steel fastener. The pouch has a partition in the inside to allow for separation of ammunition clips. Loops permit the pouch to hang from the waist belt.

(4) *Entrenching Shovel*.—The Japanese entrenching shovel has a sturdier handle and a more pointed blade than ours, and it was better for cutting the matted grass roots in the Attu tundra.

(5) *Skis*.—These were called “Glacier skis.” They were short and broad, with about two-thirds of the length extending in front of the toes. This permitted excellent maneuverability and provided ample flotation on the granular-type snow found in the Western Aleutians.

(6) *First-Aid Packet*.—All Japanese soldiers are taught first aid, and all carry a first-aid packet somewhat similar to the U. S. packet. The enemy has a powder which is designed to serve about the same purposes as our sulfa drugs, and another powder, which the soldier takes internally when wounded.

b. Wearing Apparel

(1) *Head gear*.—Enemy troops on Attu were equipped with a steel helmet, which was painted olive drab and bore the Japanese Army star insignia in the front center. The helmet, somewhat smaller than ours, apparently was made of unalloyed, or poorly alloyed, steel, and it was not as tough or as resistant to shock as the U. S. helmet.

The typical peaked Japanese field cap was found in large quantities. Also found were large numbers of a winter cap, which had ear flaps, and a fold-down section to cover the head, helmet-wise, and also the lower part of the face. The cap was lined with real fur or manufactured fleece.

Also found were grayish purple knitted helmets, made of wool and silk, which could be worn under the steel helmet.

(2) *Uniforms*.—Japanese officers wore clothing scarcely different from that of the enlisted man. The material for officers' uniforms was superior in some cases, but the tailoring was the same.

Section II. NOTES ON THE JAPANESE— FROM THEIR DOCUMENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

The information in this section has been paraphrased from translations of a variety of unrelated Japanese documents. These have been edited to eliminate repetition and passages of doubtful value. The reader must keep in mind throughout this section that the information comes from enemy sources, and that it must not be confused with U. S. methods of warfare.

2. THE DOCUMENTS

a. General Comments

This is war, and casualties are unavoidable. Our soldiers must not let themselves be stunned into a passive state of mind by the sight of casualties; each man must resolutely continue with his appointed duty.

During the course of battle, no commander will retreat except upon orders of a higher command. No unit will take action on its own initiative. No commander will oppose the plans of his superior, or lower the morale of his unit. Casualties result from misunderstanding one's mission, or failure to give proper orders. Further casualties result because lower commanders often lack self-confidence, or desire notoriety. [Editor's note: According to some earlier notes on Japanese training, considerable emphasis

was placed on the initiative and daring of small-unit leaders. Perhaps some of the latter have overstressed the point.]

If the enemy situation is completely unknown, we will not make a frontal assault.

Hand-to-hand combat during daylight hours is not advisable. It is not profitable to be foolhardy, because modern war involves tremendous fire power, with automatic guns.

b. Reconnaissance

Items which you [Japanese] will note while reconnoitering in the jungle include the following:

(1) The size of the jungle and the nature of the foliage around its edges;

(2) The nature of the terrain covering (density of plant growth, types and sizes of trees, and the condition of fallen trees);

(3) The nature of defiladed positions and the degree of defilade;

(4) The nature and condition of the terrain as a whole, including streams, marshes, cliffs, and other ground obstacles;

(5) The deviations on the compass, if any, and the accuracy of available maps or other reference material;

(6) The communication installations, if any; the condition of any inhabited areas; and any problems in connection with water supply;

(7) The degree of infestation by mosquitoes, flies, and other harmful or nuisance insects;

(8) Whether or not the area is occupied by enemy [United Nations] security detachments, positions, or defense installations; and

(9) Suitable routes for the advance of all columns.

During the advance in jungle areas, make a complete reconnaissance of the enemy situation. In addition to sending out

patrols, each unit will select competent personnel (those with excellent eyesight, such as fishermen and the natives of Ponape Island) for close-range reconnaissance.

In the jungle, the individual soldier on reconnaissance should constantly be on the alert for the slightest movement or sound. He should advance only a short distance at a time, making use of the terrain and foliage and crouching as much as possible. When resuming reconnaissance after resting, he should go forward and retreat a number of times. If an individual enemy is discovered, creep up and shoot him. Take particular care to guard your rear.

In the case of a small detachment patrolling in thick jungle, one man must go forward with his rifle ready to protect the others. It is also necessary to keep a sharp watch to the rear.

c. Advancing in Jungle

Platoons advancing in the jungle will move by squads, or deploy in two lines, or they will move in a diamond formation led by the leading squad. If hostile forces are known to be far away, there are many occasions when the platoon can move in column formation.

If hostile forces are encountered, concentrate maximum fire power on them, and maintain the advance as they retreat.

The interval between squads depends upon the density of the jungle and the nature of the terrain.

In case of a company advancing through the jungle, one platoon will form the front line, or the platoons will advance in waves. Covering fire will be provided. The direction of advance will be indicated by the leading platoons.

In approaching hostile forces, provide adequate covering fire. When closing with the enemy, it is necessary to lay down intense fire from light machine guns, rifles, and grenades. If this

fire is relaxed, not only in the advance held up but the entire tactical situation is jeopardized.

The above precautions are necessary to stamp out the "guerilla" activities of the hostile forces.

d. Assault Tactics

Consider the following possibilities in connection with launching assaults:

(1) Attract the attention of hostile forces from the front by the use of smoke, by firing, or by shouting; then assault from another direction.

(2) Wait until darkness to assault, particularly if nightfall is only 20 to 30 minutes off.

(3) Make use of rain or fog, and assault when the enemy is off guard.

(4) Assault when the enemy's attention is diverted by our bombing operations.

(5) Assault suddenly over terrain which the enemy believes to be impassable, such as cliffs, rivers, streams, steep inclines, and jungles.

During assaults, be especially careful not to group together at vital points, such as hilltops, villages, and bridges. These are excellent targets for hostile machine guns, artillery, and bombing.

e. Pursuit

Hostile forces during withdrawals always attempt to destroy installations, such as bridges, power plants, airfields, manufacturing plants, and communication facilities. Prevent this destruction by advancing at an unexpectedly fast pace. It is of vital importance to hurry the opposition during a withdrawal.

Where there are no bridges across nonfordable streams, swim across them. Your clothing and equipment will dry quickly.

Watch out for booby traps while capturing hostile establishments. First, cut electric wires to prevent explosions. Arrange for engineers to remove explosives.

f. Antitank Tactics

Some antitank weapons and methods of using them are as follows:

(1) *Magnetic mines*.—Attach them to the steel plating of the engine section, or to the turret above the driver's seat, because the armor is relatively thin at those places.

(2) *Molotov cocktail*.—Throw these at the engine section, in the rear of the tank, to set the motor afire.

(3) *Explosive with handle*.¹—Insert the explosive on top of the ground tread, so that the tread will carry the explosive to the front sprocket. Camouflage yourself thoroughly, and then crouch low as you move quickly to insert the explosive and make your getaway.

Favorable opportunities for attacking tanks at close range include the following:

(1) When a tank slows down in climbing a slope or passing over obstacles;

(2) When a tank is separated from other tanks, or from infantry;

(3) When a tank is passing through covered terrain; and

(4) At dawn, at dusk, and at night.

g. Antiaircraft Tactics

As soon as the pilot of a hostile plane sees the flash of the first antiaircraft round, he changes his course. Therefore we should limit each gun to four rounds in the first salvo.

Against fighter planes making diving attacks from several directions, it is effective to fire two types of time-fuze shells with a 1-second difference in the delay element (or more, depending on the situation).

In case a combination of hostile fighters and bombers attack us, we should fire on the fighter planes when they come close. This is particularly important where a bomber [bombers?] is used as a decoy while fighters attack from other directions.

¹ This weapon is believed to be an ordinary stick with an explosive charge (probably TNT) attached to one end.

h. Night Combat

The hostile forces have a large number of heavy and light machine guns and automatic rifles. Therefore, a careless assault, even at night, will result in great losses. Each front-line unit will deploy into the most advantageous formation and take every advantage of terrain and cover before assaulting. (For further information, refer to paragraphs 216 and 217 of the [Japanese] Infantry Training Manual.)

Because of the lack of systematic support, our firing power usually fails to achieve much success [in the Southwest Pacific]. In night attacks, prepare for simultaneous firing, even if attacks are not directed at the same objective. Reserve units should be used without hesitation.

i. Precautions with Ammunition

Every effort should be made to keep ammunition dry and cool—not over 90° F. Extreme care is required particularly for shrapnel shells, time and percussion fuzes, and so forth, which contain non-smokeless powder. Valuable opportunities have sometimes been lost because hand grenades failed to explode on account of dampness.

Observe the following points in the handling and use of ammunition:

- (1) Keep it from receiving the direct rays of the sun.
- (2) Stack it so air can circulate throughout.
- (3) Do not place ammunition directly on the ground. First put down wooden rests, so that air can circulate under the ammunition and protect it from the heat of the ground.
- (4) Keep ammunition-loaded vehicles in the shade as much as possible. Improvise awnings made of tree branches to cover the load while in transit.
- (5) Stack in the shade or under awnings the supply of ammunition at gun positions.

(6) Be sure there is space for air to circulate on the top and sides of ammunition dumps which are covered by sheets for protection against rain.

Ammunition for all guns will be protected against moisture by pasting a paper in the percussion cap (they may be fired without removing the paper).

Separate the smoke bombs filled with yellow phosphorus from the rest of the ammunition, and stack them in a cool place, out of the sun.

If air should come in contact with the yellow phosphorus, it will produce an offensive smell or a white smoke. The shell will explode unless proper steps are taken. Without delay the shell should be immersed in warm water or smothered with sand.

Signaling shells and special shells will explode spontaneously under high temperature, so keep them cool and clean and separated from other ammunition. (This information applies to the "10th-year model" grenade signal flare.)

In supplying ammunition, make no mistakes as to the fuzes for the different types of bombs and shells. Observe the marks on the fuze boxes or on the fuzes, so you will not confuse the type classifications, such as "Field Cannon," "Howitzer," and so forth. Where the outward appearance of shell cases is identical, or where different types of shells are similar, pay particular attention to the distinguishing markings on the ammunition boxes and the cases so that you will not confuse the types of fuzes for cannon.

When transporting shells, the fuze should be removed from the complete shell, except under the following circumstances:

(1) When a unit transports ammunition loaded in the regulation manner, in the specified boxes and vehicles:

(2) When a special type shell loaded with yellow phosphorus is fitted with a fuze and made completely air-tight;

(3) Where shells were fitted with fuzes when they were manufactured, or were fitted with a base fuze; and under such other circumstances as may be determined from time to time.

j. 6.5-mm Ball Ammunition

We [Japanese] have two types of 6.5-mm ball ammunition, the standard charge and the reduced charge. The standard charge weighs 2.15 grains and the reduced charge 2 grains. As a means of distinguishing between the two types, the mark © is stamped on the lower left-hand corner of the top of the box in which the reduced-charge ammunition is packed.

The suitability of these types of ammunition for the various types of 6.5-mm weapons is indicated by the following table:

Type of gun	Model 38 (1905) rifle	Model 38 (1905) carbine	Model 3 (1914) HMG	Model 11 (1922) LMG	Model 96 (1936) LMG
Type of ammunition used.	Standard charge.	Standard charge.	Standard charge.	Reduced charge.	Reduced charge.
	Reduced charge.	Reduced charge.	Reduced charge.	Standard charge when there is no alternative.	

k. Use of Captured Supplies

When the battle does not progress favorably and supply becomes very difficult, assault and capture enemy supply depots at all costs.

Since the enemy usually burns the supplies he cannot carry during withdrawals, each unit will act quickly to prevent this destruction so we may use the supplies.

I. Treatment of Prisoners (Singapore)

The handling and direction of prisoners of war at work must be still more strict. Subordinates must be trained to bear down and make the prisoners work hard. We have seen subordinates acting toward prisoners as if the latter were on an equal footing with themselves. These men do not know themselves.

Subordinates must have sufficient self-respect to place themselves on a higher level, and use prisoners as if they were Canton [China] coolies. In giving orders, use bugles, whistles, or Japanese words of command, and make the prisoners move fast. Those who lag will be dealt with rigorously, with measures to make them behave exactly as the Japanese Army wishes.

Section III. NOTES BY U. S. OBSERVERS ON JAPANESE WARFARE

1. INTRODUCTION

The information given in this section has been selected from numerous reports by U. S. observers in the Southwest Pacific theater of operations. The observations were made both by enlisted men and officers, some of whom were wounded in combat. The various reports have been paraphrased and edited to eliminate repetition. They are presented according to subject matter.

2. PERSONNEL

We found that the average Japanese soldier [on Guadalcanal] was about 5 feet 3 inches tall and weighed around 120 pounds. A few Japanese were 6-footers.

The morale of Jap prisoners was pretty low; they seemed to be pretty well fed up with the war and rather glad to be captured.

Japanese aviators seemed quite intelligent and capable; however they did not appear to measure up to our own airmen.

Mentally and physically, the Japanese labor battalions appeared to be far below the regular enemy soldiers. Some of the laborers were 50 years old. All appeared to be virtual slaves of the army. They had to bow every time a Jap soldier passed near them. This attitude existed even when representatives of both groups were prisoners in our camps.

Prisoners from the Japanese Army, Navy, and Air Force were kept in one stockade, and they didn't get along well together. Each group stayed away from the other, and there seemed to be a great deal of jealousy between services, with the navy and air force vying for supremacy.

3. TACTICS

a. General

Japanese troops on Guadalcanal usually worked in small groups, and generally two of them tried to gang up on one American, using bayonets if at close range.

Against us in New Guinea, the Japs never used automatic weapons as such, unless absolutely necessary. They fired only single shots, making it difficult for us to determine the location of their machine guns.

The enemy frequently moved reserves to threatened areas. These movements were made quickly and efficiently, suggesting that they had been rehearsed.

Inexperienced soldiers [Guadalcanal] had difficulty in distinguishing between the sound of the Japanese caliber .25 (6.5-mm) rifle and that of the U. S. caliber .45 Tommy gun or automatic pistol. However, after a little experience, they discovered that the Jap rifle has a slightly sharper crack.

In the jungle, the noise made by operation of the bolt on the Japanese caliber .25 rifle is usually not heard more than 15 feet away.

We found that the Japs sometimes fired their grenade dischargers and light machine guns from trees.

b. Defensive Positions

The Japanese on New Guinea have proved to be good defensive fighters. Their positions have been designed so the occupants can kill their attackers—protection has been a secondary consideration. Weapons have been very well sited. Machine guns, well protected by riflemen and snipers, often have been boldly sited well forward in our outer areas, in positions where they could place enfilade fire on our forward elements. Frequently the riflemen and snipers protecting machine guns have been located in trees or open pits on the front, flanks, and rear.

On Guadalcanal, Jap heavy machine guns were sometimes emplaced in pillboxes constructed of logs and dirt. These gun positions usually were in groups of five, four forming a square with the fifth in the center.

The machine guns fired through narrow lanes, which were close to the ground. It was better to stand up and move fast than to trust to concealment.

c. Scouting and Patrolling

Japanese scouting patrols [Guadalcanal] varied in number although they usually were small. Frequently they carried no weapons, or else concealed them in their uniforms.

Reconnaissance patrols generally consisted of 5 to 10 men, who usually moved about 5 yards apart. Some of these talked a lot, were not alert, and appeared to be stupid.

One combat patrol we sighted consisted of 25 men, none of whom stood out as a leader. When the patrol sighted us, it split into two groups. Another combat patrol that we encountered was smaller; it retreated immediately.

The Japanese on our front in New Guinea did not send out combat patrols until they were ready to make a general movement

forward. However, they apparently reconnoitered with small groups to secure information for later attacks.

When the Japs sent out combat patrols, these usually consisted of 30, 60, or 120 men. Their movements were similar to those of Jap units in jungle combat.

The use of small patrols purely in a reconnaissance role has often been reported. According to the terrain and their mission, these patrols either remained in one position for observation or reconnoitered while on a march of several days. Such patrols often consisted of three to six privates led by an officer or noncom.

If roads or trails were suitable, the Japanese frequently used bicycles for patrolling.

Because they made less noise, patrols often moved during the rain at night.

d. Use of Bayonets

In bayonet fighting, the Japanese apparently try to work in pairs. Their bayonets have a hook on the underside, at the hilt. One Jap tries to hook his opponent's rifle long enough for the other to use his bayonet. I never saw these tactics work successfully.

I don't believe that the Japs have had a great deal of training in the technique of using the bayonet. They did very little fencing but attempted direct jabs. They did not use the butt stroke, and were fooled by it in several instances (particularly by the vertical).

One Jap dropped the butt of his rifle to the ground and held the bayonet up at an angle against an oncoming U. S. soldier.

The Japanese bayonet was a little longer and a little more pointed than ours, but this did not seem to give the enemy any advantage.

Some officers carried sabers about 4 feet long with a hilt designed for both hands. These sabers were slightly curved.

e. Use of Grenades

Japanese fragmentation grenades are supposed to break into fragments when fired, but frequently they only split open, into two pieces, without much dispersion. The dispersal area was never greater than 20 feet.

The Jap grenade does not make a "pop" sound when the fuze ignites. The grenade usually shows smoke about 3 seconds before exploding and makes a hissing sound.

f. Ruses

In New Guinea, I noted that the enemy:

(1) Fired ballistic cartridges at night from rear positions to coincide with the Japanese throwing of grenades at close range, in an effort to deceive our troops.

(2) Fired mortars and artillery whenever our mortars opened up, to give the impression that our own mortars and artillery were shelling us.

(3) Prepared dummy posts in fairly obvious positions to draw our attackers into prepared lanes of fire.

g. Snipers

I believe that one reason the Japanese ordered their snipers to tie themselves in trees was to get us to waste our ammunition. When a sniper tied in a tree is killed, he does not fall. As other soldiers pass by later, they again spray the body with bullets. I cut down the body of one Jap who had been dead at least three days [Guadalcanal]. I counted 78 bullet holes, 60 percent of which were made by caliber .45 weapons.

I saw snipers buried in the ground [Guadalcanal] with slits just sufficient for peek holes and the muzzles of their rifles. These positions were dug to face the rear of our troops after they had passed by.

Many snipers were equipped with light climbing irons, which were made of heavy wire.

h. Communications

Although some of the enemy outposts [Guadalcanal] kept in contact with troops behind them by tapping on wood, whistling like birds, waving their arms, or shouting, the Japanese also used telephones and radios in the forward areas. Outposts and snipers are believed to have communicated with each other by jerking a wire strung between their posts.

The Japanese telephone wire was made of a good grade of copper. Containing only one strand, it was coated with some type of composition, lacquered, and painted yellow. The wire seemed to hold up well under damp conditions.

i. Recovering the Dead

The Japs go to great trouble in recovering their dead. They have been known to crawl to within a few yards of our positions in order to remove a wounded man or even a corpse. The dead are buried or cremated; this makes it difficult to estimate the number killed.

Section IV. ENEMY COMBAT NOTES ON USE OF MGs, AT RIFLES

1. INTRODUCTION

The notes given below on Japanese combat principles for machine guns and antitank rifles are paraphrased from a translation of an enemy document, which deals principally with the tactical employment of the infantry battalion machine-gun company.

A brief discussion on the organization of the machine-gun company and the battalion antitank section will help the reader to understand the Japanese notes. This organizational data deals only with the model, or "paper," composition of the units. Their actual operational strengths are usually flexible, and generally less than the "paper" figures. The machine-gun company has eight heavy machine guns and six officers and 130 enlisted men. The company is broken down into four gun platoons and an ammunition platoon. The gun platoon has two sections, each of which has one gun and 10 or 11 men. The antitank section consists of two 20-mm antitank rifles, and 17 men.

2. THE NOTES

a. General

Machine guns and the 20-mm antitank rifles operate with the rifle companies to increase their fire power—these weapons are not designed for independent use.

In firing machine guns and the 20-mm rifles, it is important to catch the hostile forces unawares, and to lay down a large volume of fire within a short period.

These weapons must follow closely behind the rifle companies during an advance.

b. Section Combat

The section leader will inspect the mechanism and the sighting of his gun before going into position so that firing can commence immediately. He will move secretly by cover afforded by the terrain, and by shadows and camouflage.

During combat the section leader will watch the enemy situation and the operation of his own gun. He will observe the range and adjust the gun sights as needed, and, if necessary, will fire the gun himself. At suitable intervals he will report to the platoon commander the amount of ammunition on hand and the condition of the gun.

c. Platoon Combat

(1) *Attack.*

While front-line rifle units are preparing for the attack, the machine-gun units will move into positions where they can be of the greatest assistance. They will make thorough preparations and maintain close coordination with the rifle companies.

Before sections occupy positions, the platoon commander will, as far as possible, inform the section leaders of the plan of occupation, the firing plan, the range and target, the position of the company as a whole, and the positions selected for the sections. He will maintain liaison with adjacent units within the zone of

advance, and, when necessary, will regulate the details of future firing and advance. The platoon commander will usually order each section to fire at the same general target, but, depending on the tactical situation, he may order them to fire on different targets.

At suitable times during combat, the platoon will change positions. Usually all platoons of the machine-gun company will change at the same time, although, under certain conditions, the change may be made in echelon.

The positions of the 20-mm antitank rifles will be chosen with a view to giving the gunners a good field of fire and as much natural cover and protection as possible.

The antitank-platoon commander will usually point out the tanks at which the gunners will fire, but he also will order the section leader, on his own initiative, to attack targets which appear to be good ones. Against flank defenses, the platoon commander will, as a rule, point out the targets for each section.

Antitank riflemen should not suffer unnecessary losses by firing too quickly and exposing their positions. They should take no notice of diversions caused by the enemy at long ranges, but they will fire against the infantry which usually accompanies hostile tanks. However, if a tank approaches within close range, the riflemen will fire on it at will, or upon orders by the company commander. On such occasions, they are to fire either on the weak spots of the tank or else concentrate their fire on the loop-hole and the peephole.

(2) *Defense.*

The machine-gun platoon commander, after having reconnoitered his sector as far as circumstances permit, will see that his guns are sited properly, and will then report to the company commander whether or not there is "dead space" between his sector and friendly troops on the flanks. There must be no weak points in the firing front.

The platoon commander, in order to facilitate the execution of his mission and to avoid needless losses, will set up several alternate gun positions, and, if possible, some dummy positions, as well. All positions must be located far enough back of the front line to prevent their being hit by friendly gunfire from the rear.

Positions will be constructed so that the gunners may stand up while firing. Communication trenches for the purpose of changing positions will be dug so that the men may traverse them by merely stooping.

Each section will prepare a firing plan. In order to simplify firing commands, as far as conditions permit, the section leader will measure the distance to the principal point where fire will be massed, and will set up markers in the forward areas and attach symbols to them. He will prepare a fire map, mark in the principal lines of fire, and will make communication arrangements.

The section leader commences firing upon orders by the company commander. The former will gradually increase his fire against the most profitable targets as the hostile forces press forward. He will lose no opportunity to fire the 20-mm antitank rifles at hostile tanks.

Even if the opposition should penetrate our positions, each section will continue firing in order to facilitate a counterattack. If necessary, the sections will advance, while firing, to more suitable positions. By not considering the question of losses, the machine-gun sections will most effectively cooperate with the unit which is counterattacking.

d. Company Combat

(1) *Attack.*

When an assault by front-line rifle units is held up or hampered, the machine-gun troops, without regard for losses, will direct their greatest fire power against the hostile forces in order to inflict maximum losses and give the rifle units an incentive for resuming the assault.

When preparing positions at night for a dawn attack, the company commander will, as far as the tactical situation permits, reconnoiter the area and decide on suitable objectives. Upon advancing into their attacking positions, the machine-gun units will effect immediate liaison with flanking units, and perform various preparatory duties, which include suitable camouflaging.

After the first-line rifle troops have launched an assault, the supporting machine-gun units must be able to catch up with them rapidly.

(2) *Defense.*

When ordered to assume the defensive, the machine-gun company commander reconnoiters his area, studies the dispositions of friendly artillery, infantry, heavy weapons, and front-line infantry, and then plans the details of his own attack.

Important points in machine-gun defense include arrangements for digging in, proper disposition of the ammunition platoon, and antiaircraft, antitank, and antigas protection.

In case of a [Japanese] counterattack from defensive positions, the machine-gun company units will advance quickly to new and convenient positions, or, with rifle troops, they may thrust toward the hostile flanks or rear, or through openings. They must attack strongly.

During the retreat, machine-gun troops do not think of losses, but sacrifice themselves for the unit as a whole by firing fiercely against the strong pressure of the enemy. They make it easy for other friendly troops to withdraw. The machine gunners will allow the hostile forces no advantage, and if the latter press close to their guns, the machine gunners will resist with vigorous hand-to-hand fighting and destroy the enemy.

Section V. SOUVENIR HUNTERS CAUSE NEEDLESS LOSS OF LIVES

Souvenir hunting—a practice which is frowned upon, even in peacetime, by many straight-thinking Americans—continues to cause needless loss of lives and injuries to U. S. soldiers in the various combat areas. Reports from commanding officers and intelligence personnel about the fighting on Attu Island state that souvenir hunters in our ranks interfered greatly with the prompt collection of intelligence data. These reports cite several instances in which lives were actually lost, or the progress of battle impeded, by soldiers who endangered the lives of comrades, as well as their own, by seeking some useless souvenir.

One observer reports that a soldier found a large pair of Japanese binoculars, which were used by the enemy to spot our planes. The soldier hid the much-needed binoculars, with the thought of picking them up for his private use after the fighting was over. Apparently it did not occur to him that the binoculars were badly needed in spotting Japanese snipers and machine gunners who were killing and wounding our men.

Private D_____ and his squad grenaded a Japanese outpost. As his squad moved forward, Private D_____ crammed deep into a pocket of his overcoat a small enemy battle flag and some sketches. They became badly soiled and almost unreadable from tundra mud and foxhole water. Days

later, at a first-aid station, the sketches were taken from the soldier's pocket and examined. They turned out to be new battle orders, which gave definite information about the enemy—in fact, they revealed the location of an artillery piece whose shell had injured Private D_____.

Many of our men apparently removed nameplates from vehicles, picked up optical equipment, and took lots of other items that would greatly have aided intelligence personnel in the combat area.

Where there was no loot of interest to the souvenir hunter, enemy quarters and matériel—useful to us—were sometimes left in utter disorder, and valuable information was destroyed. Our troops ruined food-stuffs and equipment—frequently by slashing through bales and boxes with bayonets—and they burned or damaged tents. In other words, they worked for the Japanese by accomplishing the destruction that the enemy was not given time to complete.

Enemy matériel should be destroyed when the enemy has it, but it should be preserved when it is in our hands. No matter how small or insignificant certain small items of enemy property may appear to you, they may be exactly what is needed to supply the “missing links” to important chains of information.

Remember also that the enemy will frequently booby-trap items he figures you will want as souvenirs.

Both Japan and Germany have often claimed that the efficient operation of their salvage activities has been one of the main factors in successful campaigns of the past. On Attu the Japanese made special efforts to capture our weapons, equipment, food, and cigarettes.

We must seek the enemy's matériel, and keep him from getting ours. A gun captured today may win a battle for us tomorrow. Our technicians must see everything new that is taken from the enemy. They can copy the good points and incorporate them in our own weapons, and they can devise means of countering new enemy weapons.

Remember that:

"Everything has a value in modern warfare."

"Nothing should be wasted or ignored."

"Nothing should be willfully destroyed unless it is in imminent danger of falling into enemy hands."

In connection with the handling or disposal of captured or abandoned property, the 80th Article of War says:

DEALING IN CAPTURED OR ABANDONED PROPERTY.—Any person subject to military law who buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or disposes of captured or abandoned property, whereby he shall receive or expect any profit, benefit, or advantage to himself or to any other person directly or indirectly connected with himself, or who fails whenever such property comes into his possession or custody or within his control to give notice thereof to the proper authority and to turn over such property to the proper authority without delay, shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine or imprisonment, or by such other punishment as a court-martial, military commission, or other military tribunal may adjudge, or by any or all of said penalties.

NOTE

In *Intelligence Bulletin* Vol. II, No. 1, page 86, paragraph 11, delete the statement "Water can be freed of salt by filtering it through soil." At the end of the same paragraph, delete the phrase "except for flowing springs."

